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Silence Fiction: Rethinking 
(Under) Representations of the 




L'auteure revoit la question de la marginalisation 
sociale des femmes, mais cette fois à la lumière des 
théories cognitives sociales des perceptions dirigées par 
les schémas et les stéréotypes, le raisonnement, la 
mémoire et le comportement. Les notions d'« erreur 
fondamentale d'attribution » (« fundamental attri-
bution error»), de «menace du stéréotype» («stereo-
type threat ») et de « dépendance aux influences exté-
rieures » (« outcome dependency ») seront convoquées 
afin d'expliquer pourquoi les mots et les actions des 
femmes ont traditionnellement été considérés comme 
ayant moins de portée que ceux des hommes. De plus, 
l'auteure évalue les bénéfices du modèle cognitif social 
pour les recherches en études cinématographiques: la 
compréhension raisonnée de la façon dont notre réalité 
habituelle et normative est construite peut être un 
complément fort utile aux théories cinématographiques 
de la dé-familiarisation qui invoquent la psychologie de 
l'esprk (notamment, 1'« image-temps » de Deleuze). 
ABSTRACT 
This essay readdresses the issue of the social marginal-
ization of women in light of social cognitive theories of 
schema- and stereotype-driven perception, reasoning, 
memory, and behavior. The notions of "fundamental 
attribution error," "stereotype threat," and "outcome 
dependency" will help elucidate why women's words 
and actions have traditionally been construed as less 
consequential than those of their male peers. Moreover, 
the essay discusses the benefits of the social cognitive 
model for film scholarship. It argues that social cogni-
tion's comprehensive, micro-level understanding of 
how our habitual, normative reality is constructed can 
usefully complement those theories of cinematic de-
familiarization that invoke the psychology of the mind 
(e.g., Deleuze's "time-image"). 
Since its inception, feminist scholarship has been seeking to 
understand the causes of women's oppression in patriarchy. The 
assumption has been that uncovering the mechanisms responsi-
ble for this condition will pave the way to righting social wrongs 
and breaking the symbolic silence (i.e., social fictions regulating 
female silence) that has been women's lot since time immemori-
al.1 For understandable reasons, feminist film theory has tradi-
tionally engaged methods (psychoanalysis, semiotics) that inves-
tigate how representations construct and reproduce the power 
relations that inform social reality. Given, however, Lacan's 
inability to completely eschew Freud's biological determinism 
("anatomy is destiny"), semiotically-informed psychoanalysis 
continued to tie social (and symbolic) mastery to a feature of 
the human body (the possession/lack of the penis), condemning 
women to irreparable symbolic and social incapacity. "We know 
that women speak, even though it may not be clear exactly how 
this takes place" (Doanne, 1991, p. 173). Mary Ann Doane's 
puzzlement bespeaks the theoretical impasse that was reached by 
feminist film theory in the attempt to explain and deconstruct 
women's silence (i.e., social disenfranchisement) through a 
methodology (psychoanalysis) that identifies this silence as a 
biological inevitability, and, which, furthermore, grounds its 
theory of meaning on women's symbolic and biological lack! 
I believe that in order to better understand symbolic margin-
ality, we need to examine how a normative horizon of what is 
real and significant is established and upheld within a culture. 
We do not perceive and conceive the world in a vacuum. Our 
senses are socialised to produce only certain, "meaningful" per-
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ceptions, in accordance with the categories provided by lan-
guage and other semiotic systems. As a result—we are told by 
philosophers, cognitive scientists, sociologists, and aestheti-
cians—we never experience the world as it is, in its entirety, in 
its dazzling complexity.2 Instead, we only see what we need to 
see, want to see, and are in the habit of seeing, and thinking, in 
order to survive and function well in our world. Social cogni-
tion—a relatively new discipline arising around 1975 and 
founded on the insights of social psychology and cognitive sci-
ence—can tell us how our mental representations of the social 
world are shaped by, and, in turn, help to reshape that world. 
In this essay, I propose to readdress the issue of the social 
marginalisation of women (and other disempowered groups) in 
light of social cognitive theories of schema- and stereotype-dri-
ven perception, reasoning, memory, and behaviour. I believe, 
moreover, that social cognition can provide film scholarship 
with a comprehensive, micro-level understanding of how our 
habitual, normative reality is constructed. (Althusserian 
Marxism viewed the social world from the top down, through 
the socializing functions of state institutions, and paid little 
heed to the formative force of micro-group interactions.) It is 
my impression that film aestheticians, amidst their efforts to 
map the potential of cinema to make strange the familiar (and 
so be art), have tended to overlook "the familiar" as a topic of 
investigation in its own right, treating it instead as the taken-
for-granted referent of (the much-maligned) "psychological real-
ism." For example, Gilles Deleuze—who conceives of a certain 
aesthetic practice he terms "time-image cinema" as a reaction to 
the hardwired sensorimotor processes of the body—has very lit-
tle to say about how sensorimotor processes produce the matrix 
of everyday normalcy that inventive uses of the film medium 
have the power to "reprogram." In what follows, I will attempt 
to rectify this oversight and offer through social cognition an 
anatomy of how reality is parsed and structured (and difference 
gets stigmatised) amidst social actors' situational interactions. I 
believe that a better understanding of the mechanisms underly-
ing habitual perceptions, conceptions, motivations, and actions 
will provide film theory with fresh insights concerning aesthetic 
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and political possibilities to defamiliarise and change naturalized 
visions and divisions of the world. 
Schematic Thinking and De-familiarisation 
Social cognition has over the past two decades grown into a 
dominant research paradigm in the fields of social, cognitive, 
and developmental psychology as well as artificial intelligence. 
It studies both the specific representations people have of their 
social knowledge and the processes by which social knowledge 
is constructed and used. Drawing heavily on symbolic interac-
tionism and on Jerome Bruner's cognitive constructivism (itself 
deeply rooted in Gestalt psychology), social cognition claims 
that people actively take part in the shaping of their reality. The 
social world is parsed and rendered meaningful by means of 
specific frames of reference called cognitive schémas, which 
develop from experience (they contain generalised and organ-
ised, prior social knowledge) and are used and reused to make 
sense of new experience. Schémas shape what is perceived, 
thought, and remembered and, thus, guide understanding and 
behaviour. If Simone de Beauvoir (quoted in Mills, 1995, 
p. 42) is right in claiming that "one is not born, but rather 
becomes a woman," the schema concept might prove to be a 
crucial tool in explaining how the construction of gender takes 
place. 
In a comprehensive study of social cognition, Susan T. Fiske 
and Shelley E. Taylor claim that schematic thinking informs 
every aspect of our mental functioning. Schémas (which can be 
person-schemas, self-schemas, role-schemas, event-schemas or 
scripts, and content-free schémas) "[...] influence the encoding 
of new information, memory for old information, and infer-
ences where information is missing" (Fiske and Taylor, 1991, 
p. 121). People most often cue schémas from visually prominent 
physical features like sex, race, and age. Moreover, Fiske and 
Taylor (1991, p. 122) write: 
Once cued, schémas affect how quickly we perceive, 
what we notice, how we interpret what we notice, and 
what we perceive as similar and different. Thus, anoth-
er principle of schematic encoding is its operation from 
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the earliest moments of perception. People instantly use 
age, race, sex, attractiveness, job titles, and prior trait 
descriptions [...] to form impressions.3 
According to Fiske and Taylor, people use schémas for mean-
ing making because these provide them with a sense of the world 
as a predictable: and knowable place that they have control over 
(Fiske and Taylor, 1991, p. 177). Besides, as Ziva Kunda explains 
in a recent review of the field, schémas (or a network of con-
cepts, to use a more neutral phrase) simplify mental processing 
and free up precious cognitive resources that can be used to per-
form other tasks. This implies that the more mental tasks we 
need to perform in a given period of time the more we are prone 
to rely on our stereotypes, and the less we are likely or able to 
consider individual information outside of the most obvious 
frames of reference. Speed seems to be a key motive for schema 
use, that is, a top-down, theory-driven processing of incoming 
data as opposed to a bottom-up, data-specific understanding. 
However, the costs of this mental economising (through 
schémas) may be quite high given that the generalisation and 
simplification performed by conceptual thinking go hand in 
hand with the elision and neglect of certain (seemingly unimpor-
tant) data. This may lead to misjudgments of disturbing dimen-
sions, as shown by the depreciation and marginalisation of cer-
tain groups of people due to the stereotypical assessments made 
about them (Kunda, 2000, p. 19-20). In other words, the speed, 
ease, and relative accuracy of our rule-of-thumb assessments may 
easily blind us to the fact that we are all too ready to trade a 
complex, multi-faceted (and polyphonic) world for a limited 
number of pre-packaged meanings, which, however, promise to 
make us feel safe and at home in our world. 
For many, the familiar has been more confining than reassur-
ing. The urge of early twentieth-century avant-garde art move-
ments to de-familiarise (make strange) taken-for-granted 
assumptions about the world can be seen as a reaction, and a 
challenge, to schematic perception and reasoning (which social 
cognition describes). Film came to be considered as a privileged 
means to achieve this goal due to a special affinity between the 
moving image and the basic processes of the mind. 
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The cinema/mind analogy has persisted throughout the his-
tory of film theory. Hugo Miinsterberg (whose approach is root-
ed in clinical psychology) believes that the photoplay's unprece-
dented skill to simulate, and stimulate, fundamental mental 
functions (imagination, attention, memory, emotions) enables it 
to remodel and change the world.4 Sergueï Eisenstein's theories 
of montage are inspired by different psychological models of the 
mind (e.g., Pavlovian reflexology).5 Rudolf Arnheim invokes 
Gestalt principles in his discussion of film as art.6 André Bazin's 
(1967, p. 15) celebration of the "impassive lens" of the camera 
that cleanses objects from "spiritual dust and grime" and "piled-
up preconceptions" bespeaks a (phenomenological) longing to 
see the world anew, untainted by habitual perception. Roland 
Barthes's (1977, p. 64) understanding of the "filmic" as "[...] 
that in the film which cannot be represented, the representation 
which cannot be described" reveals Barthes's primarily aesthetic 
interest in the cinema: his search for those qualities of the mov-
ing image that would enable it to induce alternative modes of 
perception and thinking and, perhaps, even to test the limits of 
the conceivable, or the merely possible. 
To my mind, Gilles Deleuze's (1989) conception of the "time 
image" (as described in Cinema 2) constitutes the most compre-
hensive (and ambitious) overview of how the film medium has 
been used to undermine schematic thinking, bringing to con-
sciousness new facets of the real. Deleuze claims that certain 
narrative and stylistic strategies can force us to temporarily sus-
pend our "logic and retinal habits" and, thereby, make the phe-
nomena appear in their "visual and sound nakedness, crudeness 
and brutality," devoid of the clichés, and metaphors, that have 
conventionally signified them (Deleuze, 1989, p. 3, 18-19 and 
p. 2O).7 In what follows I will investigate, with the help of social 
cognition, why our "logic and retinal habits" are prejudicial, and 
what the loopholes are (if any) through which our sensorimotor 
automatism could be "jammed or broken," as Deleuze would 
have it. I will focus on how negative stereotyping has affected 
social representations of women, as well as on women's struggle 
to represent themselves in meaningful terms. My feminist analy-
sis, however, will be haunted by a fundamental absence: that of 
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women as a unified, or unifiable group. Speaking about 
"women," I will keep in mind that, to paraphrase Deleuze 
(1989, p. 220), women exist "only in the condition of minori-
ty," fragmented into an almost infinite number of sub-group-
ings. 
Stereotypes: Uses and Abuses 
The mental structures that contain our beliefs and expecta-
tions about a social group are called "stereotypes" in social cog-
nition. Ziva Kunda writes that stereotypes are taken to be prod-
ucts of a prevailing culture. Children learn these meaning 
structures from their parents, friends, and the media. More 
importantly, "[...] stereotypes are assumed to result from deep 
personal needs, most notably the need to belong to one's own 
group, the need to feel superior to others, and the need to justi-
fy existing social order" (Kunda, 2000, p. 341). The significance 
of this statement can hardly be overestimated since it ties mental 
mechanisms to social needs. It suggests that the stereotypical divi-
sion of people into "in-groups" and "out-groups" (i.e., positive-
ly- and negatively-viewed social groupings) provides the social 
world with a structure that helps make it a fairly "predictable" 
place. However, again, order and clarity are purchased at a price. 
Fiske and Taylor claim that the simple categorisation of people 
into groups minimises the individual variability of the members 
of an out-group and maximises between-group differences. 
People in an in-group are typically prone to conceive of them-
selves and their own group as being positively different (i.e., bet-
ter) from out-groups whose members they perceive and remem-
ber as "all alike, different from us, and bad besides" (Fiske and 
Taylor, 1991, p. 133). Because out-group members—"usually 
people from a minority in a particular setting"—are typically 
perceived and judged along many fewer dimensions than are in-
group members, the interchangeability of out-group members 
also implies that they are not being recognised as distinct indi-
viduals. 
Fiske and Taylor (1991, p. 123) argue that "[...] categorizing 
someone as an instance of a schema slants encoding of the con-
tent of what the person does." In other words, the expectations 
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generated by the relevant role schema (or stereotype) will greatly 
influence how a given person's actions and performance will be 
judged. This, in my view, accounts for the existence of double 
(or multiple) standards in judgment: negatively stereotyped out-
group members' actions will often be conceived in negative 
terms while the same act may be valued favourably if performed 
by a member of a positively viewed in-group. Kunda (2000, 
p. 349) confirms this when she writes that "[...] our stereotypes 
can lead us to interpret identical behaviors, traits, and group 
memberships quite differently when these pertain to differently 
stereotyped individuals." She observes that a white man's success 
would typically be attributed to his talent whereas the same 
achievement of a woman or a black man would be explained by 
their hard work or good luck (Kunda, 2000, p. 348). Similarly, 
I would argue, such discursive phenomena as indirectness, 
silence, hedges, euphemisms, or tag questions (which have been 
identified as specificities of a female "genderlect") will be judged 
differently when found in men's and women's language use. 
Therefore, it is not so much the quality of the words themselves 
that makes women's speech less effective and authoritative than 
that of men. Rather, the traditional dismissal of women's dis-
course as inconsequential or irrational can be attributed to the 
negative stereotyping of women as a social group.8 On the one 
hand, in patriarchal cultures women have been discriminated 
against as the second, the weaker (and the "fair" but illogical) 
sex. It is quite telling that leading Western democracies denied 
their women the right to vote (i.e., to have a voice and make a 
difference in the public sphere) until the third, fourth, or even 
fifth decade of the twentieth century.9 On the other hand, as I 
will argue shortly, many women's verbal performance is effec-
tively constrained by the negative expectations they encounter in 
the social arena. In Ziva Kunda's (2000, p. 313) words, "[...] 
the mere fact that negative stereotypes are ' in the air ' may 
result in a social climate that can hinder the performance of 
negatively stereotyped individuals." 
"Woman," however, is not a monolithic entity, nor do people 
conceive of it as such. Indeed, Fiske and Taylor point out that 
people may not habitually think at the level of such "blanket 
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categories" as male or female, rather they tend to use "basic-
level" categories (e.g., "career woman," rather than the "upper-
level" category "woman" or the "lower-level" category "woman 
lawyer"). Basic-level sub-categories are useful since they allow 
people to fine-tune their general categories with the help of the 
limited amount of individuating information they may have at 
their disposal. Unfortunately, it appears, the content of the 
upper-level category tends to take precedence over situation-spe-
cific information (e.g., assertiveness, independent-mindedness). 
Thus, for example, Fiske and Taylor (1991, p. 143) tell us, 
women whose behavior contradicts their gender role may be 
viewed on the basic level as lesbians or as unlikeable macho 
women. Incidentally, white ("mainstream") feminists' ignorance, 
negligence, and/or depreciation of the specific experiences of 
women of colour is another instance of the stereotype-driven 
judgmental double standard. It also demonstrates a hierarchical 
ordering of "subtypes" within broad stereotypes. (However, 
social cognition does little to investigate the graded subdivisions 
of "women" along the lines of race, ethnicity, class, occupation, 
age, or sexual preference.10) 
The above discussion of stereotypes establishes stereotypical 
thinking as the default mode of our mental functioning. 
However, the social cognitive model also highlights certain cir-
cumstances that may mitigate the effects of a negative stereotype, 
and even block its application, if only temporarily. We will find 
that the lower the level of abstraction (that is, the more concrete 
and particular an instance is) the easier it is to bypass the effects 
of broad stereotypes. (If we have more time to formulate a judg-
ment we may be inclined to pay more attention to individual 
data and to rely less on our "autopilot.") Moreover, if we are fac-
ing a social environment that consists largely of people who are 
generally characterised by the same upper-level stereotype 
("woman"), we might shove our general schema (of womanhood 
and gender bias) aside and take a closer look at the social actors 
as individuals. I believe that the cinema can supply us with sever-
al telling examples of how these cognitive strategies work. 
Let me begin with films that highlight a community of women. 
Douglas Sirk's Imitation of Life (1959) offers sensitive, nuanced 
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portrayals of the daily interactions of four women who share a 
living space for decades. Sirk's choice of a "female genre" (the 
domestic melodrama) gives him the licence to situate his story 
largely within the boundaries of a household—which in this 
case consists exclusively of women—and, thereby, to elide cru-
cial aspects of social reality. To the extent that the outside world 
remains foreclosed from the diegesis, so also does gender differ-
ence (and negative female stereotyping). Rather, the rarefied 
atmosphere of this female domestic space prompts us to consid-
er the four protagonists along other, "unexpected" dimensions, 
for example, in terms of their race, social and financial status, 
and age.11 Paradoxically, the only excessive display of female sex-
uality in the film (performed by Sara Jane) serves to cover over 
(and to undo) the stigma of blackness. However, the success of 
this emancipatory move is highly dubious not only because the 
social view encapsulated in stereotypes becomes "internalised"12 
by stigmatised groups, but also since Sara Jane's "passing" firmly 
grounds her in the ranks of another negatively stereotyped social 
group, that of "loose" women. We watch with skepticism her 
attempts to liberate herself from the label of blackness through 
turning herself into the spectacle of woman, "to-be-looked-at-
ness," acting as a cabaret dancer and a chorus girl. Imitation of 
Life exemplifies how the "community of women" type of films 
can cue us to bypass certain superordinate categories and acti-
vate other, less frequently used lower-level ones. The long list of 
such films includes, for example, Little Women (Cukor, 1933; 
Armstrong, 1994), Steel Magnolias (Ross, 1989), Fried Green 
Tomatoes (Avnet, 1991), How to Make an American Quilt 
(Moorhouse, 1995), Chocolat (Hellstrom, 2000), Antonias Line 
(Gorris, 1995), Women on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown 
(Almodovar, 1988), and Daughters of the Dust (Dash, 1991). 
An alternative strategy has been to target the upper-level 
(abstract) notion of "woman." Sally Potter's adaptation of 
Virginia Wolfe's Orlando (1993) throws into relief the arbitrari-
ness of the gender divide by the protagonist's seamless transub-
stantiation (performed by an ethereally androgynous Tilda 
Swinton) from man to woman. A similar confusion of gender 
(and sexual) identities is portrayed in Fassbinder's In a Year of 
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Thirteen Moons (1978). By distorting, and even rendering 
unidentifiable the physical (visual and auditory) features that 
would, under normal circumstances, trigger the activation of a 
broad stereotype, these films effectively block the use of that 
stereotype. After all, if we cannot decide whether (or, the degree 
to which) it is a man or a woman, we don't know which gender 
schema to apply to make sense of this person. 
Another successful way to challenge stereotypical thinking 
about women has been the doubling of the female protago-
nist—either by two actresses who take turns portraying the 
same character, as in Bunuel's That Obscure Object of Desire 
(1977), or by two identical-looking yet separate characters 
played by the same actress, as in Kieslowski's The Double Life of 
Véronique (1991). This time it is the characters status as a dis-
crete, self-identical person that is called into question and left 
tantalisingly unresolved. As long as the spectator s main concern 
remains to decide whether or not the protagonist is identical 
with herself ("is this woman one and the same person?"), the 
issue of gender is shoved to the side. Moreover, the character s 
undecideable ontological status is often taken to be a statement 
about the mysterious, unknowable nature of "woman," contra-
dicting the categorical pronouncements that have been used to 
define this category. The doublings described here would qualify 
as "crystalline images" of time in the Deleuzean sense since they 
render indiscernible pairs of distinct images.13 As a result, 
Deleuze claims, the time image has the power to disengage our 
automatic sensorimotor schémas, and hence to suspend stereo-
typical thinking. 
As I have shown, the availability of time (or lack thereof) is a 
crucial factor in determining how we process incoming data. 
When a situation does not compel us to make quick inferences 
in order to form judgments and decide on an immediate course 
of action, we are more likely to attend to details that would at 
first sight be dismissed as insignificant and/or irrelevant (i.e., if 
considered schematically from the top down). By implication, 
films that do not demand that we concentrate our cognitive 
resources largely on narrative construction (as when watching 
action-packed, fast-paced mainstream cinema) will enable us to 
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dwell on individual information for its own sake, independent 
from familiar interpretive contexts. This, I believe, is why 
Deleuze celebrates time image cinema (as opposed to the move-
ment image that engages sensorimotor processes): because, by 
decomposing motion and presenting "pure" time, the cinema of 
the seer (as opposed to that of the "agent" of the movement 
image) prompts us to put our pre-programmed sets of judg-
ments and actions on pause, and to perceive and conceive 
"pure" stimuli in their pristine meaninglessness (as opsigns and 
sonsigns). Ordinary, monotonous, banal occurrences, and, in 
general, a slow pacing of the images may trigger such mental de-
familiarisation (Deleuze, 1989, p. 2 and p. 13-15). This would 
suggest that films dedicated to the meticulous depiction of a 
character's repetitive everyday actions and not much else have a 
good chance to de-activate schema-driven (top down) thinking. 
Chantai Akerman's Jeanne Dielman, 23 Quai du commerce, 1080 
Bruxelles (1975), Agnès Vardas Cleo from 5 to 7 (1961), Benoît 
Jacquot 's Single Girl (1995) , and Luc and Jean-Pierre 
Dardenne's Rosetta (1999) exemplify this strategy. Through their 
close attention to women's day-to-day (or hour-to-hour) activi-
ties, these films force us to make sense of the women in terms of 
the concrete, material situations that they inhabit and shape. 
Women Under "Stereotype Threat" 
Let me briefly return to the social cognitive model of stereo-
types, and specifically to the phenomenon of the "stereotype 
threat," which, I believe, can throw further light on why physio-
logically-provided language skills do not necessarily translate to 
articulateness in social contexts that matter. As I have indicated 
above, negative stereotyping has serious consequences for out-
group members' performance and self-esteem. "A negative 
group stereotype may lead one to treat members of that group 
poorly which, in turn, may lead them to behave poorly, thereby 
confirming the stereotype," Kunda writes. She argues that peo-
ple belonging to minority groups may show less competence 
than members of socially dominant groups because of the dis-
criminatory treatment levelled against them that undermines 
their ability to perform competently. Stereotype threat (i.e., the 
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fear of being judged by the negative stereotype of one's group) 
poses a serious challenge to the performance of stigmatised indi-
viduals "[...] because the knowledge that they are attempting to 
solve tasks in which they are negatively stereotyped can suffice 
to undercut their results"(Kunda, 2000, p. 323-324 and 
p. 379). 
It appears that social practitioners' general unawareness of the 
paralyzing effects of the stereotype threat (including the 
unawareness of those who are subject to it) makes them liable to 
a common judgmental error which is termed the "fundamental 
attribution error" in cognitive psychology (Kunda, 2000, 
p. 428-432 and p. 532). People's tendency to overestimate the 
role of personality traits and dispositions in causing behavior 
and to underestimate the role of external pressures exerted by a 
particular situation seems to work in tandem with stereotypical 
thinking, which operates with clusters of fairly constant traits. 
Therefore, I will argue, it makes more sense to look for the caus-
es of women's proverbial incoherent, unclear, and hesitant 
speech in situational constraints shaped by a stereotype threat 
(i.e., the unfavourably biased reception of women's ideas in 
social fields that matter, together with women's awareness that 
their verbal performance is expected to be poor) rather than in 
women's proclivity to use hedges—e.g., "sorta," "kinda,"—tag 
questions, and euphemisms, as suggested by feminist linguist 
Robin Lakoff.14 
The shakiness of out-group members' position is increased by 
their uncertainty in deciding how to interpret in-group mem-
bers' views about them. As Kunda (2000, p. 371) puts it, 
If you are Black, or female, or a member of any other 
group that has been the victim of discrimination, both 
positive and negative feedback from mainstream indi-
viduals and organizations can be difficult to interpret. 
You may never know whether such feedback reflects an 
assessment of your ability or a reaction to your race and 
gender. 
In my view, affirmative action may have a very similar effect on 
those whom it purports to benefit. For example, Ruth Behar, a 
Cuban-American feminist anthropologist, describes the insecu-
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rity she felt at her acceptance to an Ivy League college, wonder-
ing whether she was admitted because of her Hispanic status 
only and promising to prove to herself that she was "not a 
minority student" (Behar, 1995, p. 325). Women scholars invit-
ed to participate at conferences in order to set the gender bal-
ance (almost) right may likewise wonder about the actual appre-
ciation and worth of their work. Marie-Pierre Le Hir's (2000, 
p. 125) comment that "[...] an academic discipline perceived as 
a women's discipline tends to lose its prestige" supports the 
claim that symbolic capital (Pierre Bourdieu's term for accumu-
lated prestige) is still unevenly distributed in the public sphere. 
Obviously, we must not forget that women scholars—and, in 
general, women who have been trained to master the discursive 
practices that are highly-valued socially—wield more symbolic 
capital than most social groups of women. However, in the 
company of their male peers, even the most highly-qualified 
women can quickly find themselves (and their style) cramped by 
the "glass ceiling" of the stereotype threat. 
I believe that the sensitive analytical apparatus developed by 
social cognition to study meaning construction through micro-
group interactions can be easily adapted to the study of the 
diegetic universe of a film. Social cognition can help us under-
stand how spectators make sense of fictional characters' interac-
tions, as well as how the characters themselves evaluate other 
characters in a film. For example, the social cognitive concept of 
the stereotype threat can be usefully applied to explore why cer-
tain practices, and practitioners, are deemed valuable while oth-
ers are depreciated by a community. As an illustration, I will 
examine how the double standard that informs the evaluation of 
men's and women's professional performance has been thema-
tised in Courage Under Fire (Zwick, 1996), a Hollywood film 
that focuses on the military as the (allegedly) last remaining 
occupational field where women are admittedly discriminated 
against. The added interest of the film is its portrayal of the 
effects of negative gender stereotypes on memory. 
Courage Under Fire is a detective story à la Rashomon that 
seeks to establish the circumstances of a death through the rec-
ollections of eye witnesses. (Not surprisingly, Hollywood will 
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find a way to reconcile the contrasting testimonies and uncover 
the Truth.) Captain Karen Walden (Meg Ryan) is posthumously 
nominated for the Medal of Honor for her courage shown dur-
ing the Gulf War. Recalling the incident in which Captain 
Walden lost her life, surviving members of her unit offer 
remarkably different accounts of the female Captains behavior. 
A soldier who owes his life to her remembers her as a coura-
geous, responsible, and determined commanding officer. 
(Ironically, the soldier's female companion disparages Captain 
Walden for being "butch.") Another member of the unit, Ilario, 
who has known Walden for years before the Gulf War mission, 
repeatedly refers to her by her first name—a slip that would be 
unpardonable, and unthinkable, were he to be speaking of a 
male ranking officer. Voicing the film's sympathetic attitude 
towards women, Ilario reflects on the hardships Captain Walden 
had to endure in the army in order to be considered her male 
peers' equal. Considering how she is being remembered, Karen 
Walden's death proves that, her personal valor notwithstanding, 
she finally lost the battle against sexist prejudice. 
As additional flashback recollections reveal, during the critical 
events that resulted in the Captain's death her command was 
challenged by one of the soldiers, Monfriez, who ended up 
shooting her. Monfriez, whose macho traits the film underlines 
(partly through his Latino ethnicity), remembers the Captain as 
a coward, quoting her tearful reaction to a crisis situation to 
prove his point. However, it soon becomes obvious that 
Monfriez's negative opinion of Walden has little to do with her 
actual behavior, which, as the film later shows, was impeccable. 
Rather, it is Monfriez's rampant sexism (which triggered his 
criminal behavior, as well as his need to hide what really hap-
pened) that distorts his memories of Captain Walden's actions. 
(In one of Ilario's flashbacks Monfriez addresses his command-
ing officer as "cunt.") Ilario, too, recalls Walden crying. 
However, while Monfries emphasises the occurrence in order to 
justify his negative opinion of her character and ability to com-
mand, in Ilario's memories Walden's tears rather confirm her 
self-discipline and control over the situation. (Monfriez, reason-
ing, that "she behaved cowardly, as a woman would," is an 
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instance of the fundamental attribution error.) This discrepancy 
in recall is congruent with what social cognition holds about the 
effect of schémas on memory. "The expectancies we have about 
other people influence the way we process their attributes and 
behaviors, and thereby, help determine what we later recall 
about these people," Kunda (2000, p. 168) states. "Our memo-
ries can be systematically biased because they reflect not only 
the reality we have observed but also the manner and extent to 
which we have processed that reality." This, again, confirms that 
reality is construed by (and reflects) prevailing social norms and 
stereotypes, and is, hence, shot through and through with preju-
dice. 
Woman As Translator 
So far, social cognition has taught us that sexism, ageism, and 
ethnic and racial prejudices are the consequences of schema-dri-
ven perception, inference making, and memory. What has not 
been discussed is how these value-laden distinctions come 
about, turning certain groups of people into "disliked" out-
groups and allowing others to conceive of themselves, and be 
conceived by group-alien outsiders, as the in-group. Fiske and 
Taylor (1991, p. 146) note that "[p]eople's treatment of those 
who are without power—such as children, retarded adults, for-
eigners [...] or, historically, women and minority groups" sug-
gests that "people may have power-based schémas." However, 
power is obviously not a topic for social cognitive investigation. 
People s goal orientation and the varying degrees of their out-
come dependency on others may shed some light on social strat-
ification and in-group/out-group formation. Fiske and Taylor 
suggest that one of the main reasons why people prefer schema 
use to processing information from the bottom up is that 
"[p]eople's goals when they examine information are at least as 
important as the information itself." Since schémas appear to be 
"accurate enough" for predicting and controlling the outcome of 
one's actions, people find it practical to use and maintain their 
schémas. As Fiske and Taylor (2000, p. 155) put it, "[...] if you 
know what to expect, then you know what to do to try to get 
what you want."15 This goal-oriented outlook on schema use 
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posits a hierarchy of interests as the guiding principle behind 
social cognitive processes. It is the particular array of needs tied 
to a particular interaction together with the costs of being wrong 
which determine the relative balance between people's use of 
schémas (i.e., stereotypes) versus concrete data and, as Jones and 
Thibaut write, "[...] fortunately for cognitive economy, we need 
not be indiscriminately attentive to all the cues provided by the 
other actor(s)" ( quoted in Fiske and Taylor, 2000, p. 155). 
I would argue that this "discriminate attention" to "relevant" 
detail (through the use of schémas) explains discrimination 
against groups of people who are deemed "irrelevant" (of little 
consequence) in terms of the gratification of social practitioners' 
needs. As Fiske and Taylor (1991, p. 156) put it, "If your out-
comes (rewards, costs, benefits, or punishments) depend on 
someone else's actions as well as on your own, you are outcome 
dependent on that person." When people are outcome-depen-
dent, they need to pay more attention to the other person, 
which implies that they especially attend to schema-inconsistent 
information and rely less on their schémas. In more specific 
terms, this means that negatively viewed outgroups in a social 
context—women, people of colour, old people, etc.—may not 
often be in the position to seriously influence others' outcomes. 
Consequently, they will not receive the attention necessary for 
changing the prevailing, overly simplistic, and prejudice-laden 
stereotypes that signify them. In reverse, given their own high 
outcome-dependency, these socially devalued groups are com-
pelled to pay particular attention to and familiarise themselves 
with in-group members' values and expectations—which con-
cern them in negative terms. Mediating between self and other 
is the burdensome task of the underdog, who does not know for 
certain which of these two categories describe her or him best. 
I believe that women's "translating skills" as well as the bi-
modal (i.e., "female" and "neutral") female linguistic practices 
described by feminist linguists can be explained by women's 
general outcome-dependency on men in patriarchal cultures. 
Since speaking like a woman (in other words, discussing "incon-
sequential" topics, being inconsistent, deferential, emotional, 
and indecisive) is "socially unproductive and politically inexpe-
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dient," as Deborah Cameron (1985, p. 105) puts it, women 
need to switch to the "neutral" (read masculine) code, which is 
the register invested with/by symbolic power, in order to make a 
difference. (However, as we have seen, assertive, articulate, self-
assured women are often disparaged for their comeuppance, as 
shown by the pejorative labels of "macho woman" or "butch.") 
Robin Lakoff suggests that women's "bilingual" status in patri-
archy, together with the special situational awareness that trans-
lating requires, saps women's creative energies, hindering them 
from "[...] expressing themselves as well, as fully, or as freely as 
they might otherwise"(Cameron, 1985, p. 222). Besides, as we 
have seen, women's full and free expression is further con-
strained by the stereotype threat, a constant reminder of their 
discursive disability. It might be argued, as Lakoff has done, that 
women's translation of themselves into socially meaningful 
terms under these difficult conditions depletes cognitive energy 
and bars them from introducing new terms in the social game. 
Women's strenuous efforts to catch up prevent them from tak-
ing the lead. The plight and dilemmas of the translating woman 
(and the complex relationship between translation and power) 
are poignantly portrayed in Atom Egoyan's Calendar (1993). 
Calendar offers an anatomy of the intricate translating 
processes that inform the age that has been alternately called 
"postcolonial" and "postmodern." It comes as no surprise that 
the character who is in control of the new technology (the digi-
tal) and the resulting culture of the "televisual" is a white male 
photographer living in North America. The film chronicles his 
trip to Armenia to photograph old churches for a calendar, as 
well as the disintegration of his marriage to his Armenian-born 
wife, whom he uses as a translator to facilitate his exchange with 
his native country (whose language he does not master), and 
whom he eventually loses to that country, and to an Armenian 
man. Although the photographer apparently controls the ulti-
mate means of translation (i.e., the postmodern common 
denominators, money and the bit), he is unable to maintain 
meaningful communication with his significant others: his wife 
(and other women, whose companionship he buys) and his 
native culture. (His wife's abilities to translate—that is, to medi-
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ate—have proved ineffectual in the face of his silences and inar-
ticulate stutters.) As a final (futile) attempt to master verbal lan-
guage, the photographer commodifies it—through his purchase 
of foreign-speaking female voices—and serialises it—by reduc-
ing it into interchangeable stretches of nondescript background 
murmur (in the form of scripted dinner conversations and 
phone calls that become endless loops). 
Calendar confirms the social cognitive insight (voiced also by 
several feminist critics16) that translation-as-mediation, together 
with other activities of negotiation, is the lot of those who are 
heavily outcome-dependent on powerful others. This is equally 
true for intra- and />z^r-linguistic translations. (On a global 
level, speakers of "minor" tongues need to learn the terms of the 
ruling languages if they want to be heard.) Calendar features 
English as the dominant language, a prerogative of the white 
Western male (the photographer). All other languages are treat-
ed as a kind of exotic (and erotic) noise, an attribute especially 
of women—who, significantly, all master English besides their 
respective mother tongues (i.e., all the women in the film are 
translators)—but also, significantly, of a man who is a native of 
a "developing country" (Armenia). Characteristically, the 
Armenian driver does not speak English, a fact which supports 
the claim that members of dominant groups do not typically 
engage in translations. In patriarchal communities, like 
Armenia, the law speaks with a male "accent" and there is no 
need for men to develop additional communicative skills. 
Paradoxically, the translator, who seems to be at home in sev-
eral languages, cultures, and relationships, finds herself finally 
dispossessed of all. Her search for history, identity, and agency 
appears futile and passé in an age that has proclaimed the death 
of the subject. Her newly-found speaking voice (i.e., her ability 
to speak for herself) makes little sense in the realm of an elec-
tronically simulated (virtual) reality—controlled, as we have 
seen, by the male photographer. The translator's retreat to a tra-
ditional society, Armenia (where history and subjecthood still 
make sense, if only from a male perspective) poignantly illus-
trates the intrinsic "homelessness" of all translators, this unde-
cidable, unending oscillation between "selfhood" and "other-
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ness"—which also informs, and haunts, the Deleuzean time 
image. 
Social Cognition: Is Change Possible? 
The question is, where do we go from here? If thinking in 
terms of various networks of concepts (schémas) is hardwired in 
our mental makeup, can we at least change our schémas? Social 
cognition's prognosis concerning schema change is not very 
optimistic. Since well-developed, stable schémas "[...] lend a 
sense of order, structure, and coherence to social stimuli that 
otherwise would be complex, unpredictable, and overwhelm-
ing," Fiske and Taylor (1991, p. 150) write, people have a high 
stake in maintaining their schémas. Kunda believes that "[...] 
we may be motivated to preserve our stereotypes because these 
help us to justify our social order, our own discriminatory behav-
ior, or our sense of superiority to others." Kunda reminds us 
that stereotypes are frequently activated automatically (i.e., 
without us being aware of doing it), which suggests that our 
power to control our stereotypical thinking is limited (Kunda, 
2000, p. 386 and p. 322-323). Although we are able to inhibit 
the activation of a stereotype and, thus, avoid "the subtle and 
unintended consequences" it would have on our perception of 
others, suppressed stereotypes have a tendency to return with a 
vengeance (Kunda, 2000, p. 342 and p. 345). Since stereotype 
activation requires much cognitive energy (but, then, so does 
not using stereotypes) there is hope that we might not activate a 
stereotype if we need to focus on other demanding cognitive 
tasks. Moreover, Fiske and Taylor (1991, p. 154) note, there are 
certain strategies (e.g., "providing alternative schémas and focus-
ing on the other as an individual") that may induce people to 
neglect the use of certain schemas/stereotypes. However, this 
does not alter the stereotype itself. 
If we think that contact with atypical group members can 
trigger a change in the stereotype, we are mistaken. In order not 
to be compelled to alter our stereotypical notion of the out-
group per se, we tend to judge negatively stereotyped people 
who have positive attributes as atypical subtypes. "It is ironic," 
Kunda notes, "that the more individuals deviate from the stereo-
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type of their group, the less likely they are to bring about stereo-
type change." We are most likely to modify our stereotype if we 
come across "[...] individuals who disconfirm the stereotype of 
their group on one dimension" but are "[...] typical of their 
groups stereotype in other ways" (Kunda, 2000, p. 384, 390 
and p. 386). This suggests that individual reformers are more 
socially beneficial than lone revolutionaries, at least in the short 
term. (According to this logic, Susan Sarandon, for example, 
would run a better chance to alter slightly the female stereotype 
than Madonna.) Incidentally, this pragmatist view on social 
change seems to be in agreement with recent multicultural femi-
nist theories that speak of the improbability of a "total" revolu-
tion and instead advocate contingent forms of resistance as new 
ways of transformative politics.17 Gilles Deleuze (1989, p. 218-
220) has expressed a similar opinion with respect to the objec-
tives of modern political cinema. 
Dramatic changes in stereotypes do occur, but only over 
extended time periods, Kunda observes, without paying further 
heed to the topic. As we have seen, the primary concern of social 
cognition is to shed light on how mental processes shape, and are 
shaped by, our interactions in social contexts. However, by limit-
ing its inquiry to individuals' immediate apprehension of, and 
reaction to, their lived experience, the social cognitive approach 
fails to take into account the fact that peoples mental processes 
and patterns of behavior are products (as well as producers) of the 
social formation they inhabit. If we wish to explain why certain 
social groups are more powerful than others and how stereotypes 
evolve through time we need to turn to theories that describe the 
structural, as well as functional, properties of the social world in 
a historical frame. I believe that Pierre Bourdieu's notion of the 
habitus—a concept not dissimilar from, although much more 
intricate than cognitive schémas—can usefully complement 
social cognitive explanations of women's disenfranchisement in 
patriarchy.18 
Concluding Remarks 
The notion that a representation may structure reality sug-
gests that changing our images of a world has the power to 
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reform (i.e., reshape and, possibly, improve) the world. This 
insight has prompted reform-minded artists, aestheticians, and 
social theorists to explore strategies that may dismantle norma-
tive ways of viewing the world. Feminists, for example, have 
sought to undo the symbolic silence that has enveloped women 
in patriarchal societies, denying them a social voice, and signifi-
cance. Due to an affinity between the human mind and the film 
medium, the cinema has been considered a privileged mean of 
such de-familiarisation. Nevertheless, amidst their pursuits of 
the unfamiliar, film theorists have often taken "the familiar" for 
granted. (Marxist psychoanalytic semiotics considered the real 
in structural terms, from the top down, and paid little heed to 
particular actors and practices.) 
In this paper I have proposed to take a new look at the every-
day world from the bottom up, through social actors' pragmatic 
and ongoing mental theorising about, and interactions in, this 
world. I have argued that social cognition could shed new light 
on how normative (prejudicial) judgments (e.g., about women) 
are formed and propagated, and, thereby, suggest strategies to 
undercut such representations. Therefore social cognition could 
benefit film aesthetics, especially by complementing those theo-
ries of cinematic de-familiarisation that invoke the psychology 
of the mind (e.g., Deleuze's time image). Moreover, a social cog-
nitive interactional model offers insights on how spectators eval-
uate fictional characters as well as how characters understand (or 
fail to understand) each other. 
Through the concept of the cognitive schema, social cognition 
demonstrates how peoples perceptions, inferences, memory, and 
actions are based on models of social knowledge. Because 
schémas are cued by prominent visible features, schémas of gen-
der, race, and age are the most frequently used interpretive 
frames for evaluating people. Thus identifying a person as a 
woman triggers, at the moment of perception, the relevant 
stereotype that "frames" how that person is evaluated in a social 
context. People's tendency to overestimate the role of personality 
traits and dispositions in causing behavior (e.g., "she is a woman, 
therefore she is cowardly") and to underestimate the role of 
external pressures exerted by a particular situation is called "the 
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fundamental attribution error" in social cognition. Another 
important social cognitive concept is "stereotype threat," which 
explains how stigmatised group members' awareness of the nega-
tive expectations that are leveled against them has an 
unfavourable effect on these people's performance, confirming, 
in turn, the prejudiced view. 
Schema use simplifies and speeds response to the stimuli of 
the social world. Nevertheless, stereotypical thinking delimits 
and distorts our judgments. The social cognitive insight that 
disfavoured groups' traits and actions are consistently construed 
in terms of simplistic preconceived ideas may explain women's 
(and, in general, marginalised social groups') lack of a distinctive 
subjectivity. Moreover, because most women do not typically 
have the social prominence to significantly influence others' 
outcomes, they do not merit the social attention and cognitive 
effort that would be needed to fill in (individualise) the overly 
generalising categories that signify them. Therefore if women 
want to make a difference in highly-valued social contexts, they 
need to develop translating skills that use up valuable cognitive 
resources which could be profitably employed elsewhere. 
Although schémas are fundamental structures of our mental 
makeup, and schema change is costly, schematic thinking can be 
(temporarily) overridden. I have shown how certain films have 
made use of the "loopholes" of the cognitive system in order to 
neutralise the harmful effects of the negative stereotyping of 
women. In fact, I have argued, Deleuze's complex study of the 
time image can be read as a compilation of the narrative and styl-
istic strategies through which the cinema has challenged (or 
should challenge) the automatic activation of our sensorimotor 
schémas. However, Deleuze's (1989, p. 224) suggestion that a new 
political cinema should undertake to invent the missing people 
(and social meanings) "through trance or crisis," through render-
ing indiscernible virtual and real, raises serious questions concern-
ing the pragmatic value of his deconstructivist aesthetic. The ques-
tion remains, can the social mind be restructured? Can difference 
ever be construed in terms other than distinction and deviance? 
University of California 
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1. "Silence is a woman's glory," Aristotle asserted 2300 years ago and was followed 
by innumerable (male) sages who invariably prescribed reticence as the preferred 
mode of discourse for the female. The proverbial female volubility (i.e., women's 
notoriety for endless but empty, unclear, and inconsequential speech) does only 
apparently contradict the notion of the "silent woman": it can be construed as a 
modality of women's symbolic silence. Soren Kierkegaard confirms this when writing 
that "It requires no proof that a woman can talk." Wha t a woman lacks in 
Kierkegaard's view is "[...] the power of reflection to insure her against self-contradic-
tion for any considerable time." Kierkegaard's observation that a woman is unable to 
grasp the logic of "reduplication" (i.e., representation) precedes the Freudian-Lacanian 
thesis that women have no access to symbolisation. Aristotle and Kierkegaard are 
quoted in Agonito (1977, p. 54, 176 and p. 181.) 
2. As Gilles Deleuze puts it, paraphrasing Henri Bergson, "[...] we do not perceive 
the thing or the image in its entirety, we always perceive less of it, we perceive only 
what we are interested in perceiving, or rather, what it is in our interest to perceive, 
by virtue of our economic interests, ideological beliefs, and psychological demands." 
Therefore, Deleuze (1989, p. 20) concludes, we perceive only clichés. James Elkins 
(1996, p. 22) argues that we always look with a purpose, namely to use and possess 
the object we are facing. 
3. Emphasis in the original. 
4. It is, however, questionable to what extent the mind can surpass—with the help 
of cinema—the "unalterable" laws of the outside world. Munsterberg himself delimits 
the freedom of art, and of the mind, by warning the photoplay not to explore things 
which are "not worth knowing" (Munsterberg, 1970, p. 62, 78, 95 and p. 97). 
5. On Eisenstein's theories of montage see "Eisenstein's Epistemological Shift" 
(Bordwell, 1974-75), and The Cinema of SergueïEisenstein (Bordwell, 1993). 
6. Arnheim writes: "In order to understand a work of art, however, it is essential 
that the spectator's attention should be guided to [certain] qualities of form, that is, 
that he should abandon himself to a mental attitude which is to some extent unnatur-
al" (Arnheim, 1957, p. 43). 
7. Deleuze was clearly inspired by Alain Robbe-Grillet's ideas on the new novel, on 
the cinema, and de-familiarisation. Robbe-Grillet, in turn, echoes the Russian 
Formalists' credo of "making strange" when he envisions a new novel that would open 
our eyes and minds to the fact that " [a] round us, defying the noisy pack of our ani-
mistic or projective adjectives, things are there" (Robbe-Grillet, 1965, p. 19). 
8. Deborah Tannen (Tannen, 1994, p. 21) expresses a similar view claiming that 
"[...] one cannot locate the source of domination, or of any interpersonal intention 
or effect, in linguistic strategies such as interruption, volubility, silence, and topic rais-
ing, as has been claimed. Similarly, one cannot locate the source of women's power-
lessness in such linguistic strategies as indirectness, taciturnity, silence, and tag ques-
tions." 
9. The first countries to grant women the right to vote were New Zealand (1893) 
and Australia (1902). They were followed by Finland (1906) and Norway (1913). 
Great Britain followed suit in 1918. The U. S. (and Hungary) allowed full franchise 
for women in 1920. France and Italy procrastinated until 1945, while Switzerland 
waited until 1971 (!). It was in 1952 that the United Nations Convention of Political 
Rights for Women passed a decree stating that "women shall be entitled to vote in all 
elections on equal terms with men without any discrimination." In the meanwhile, 
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women are still denied voting rights in conservative Arab countries around the 
Persian Gulf. (Source: http:\\ www.britannica.com) 
10. The fact that social cognitive accounts of stereotypical thinking themselves tend 
to dwell at the level of upper level categories (treating, for example, women and black 
men as interchangeable instances of the negatively-stereotyped outgroup, as Kunda 
does above) suggests that social cognition might need to fine tune its (schematic) ana-
lytical methods in order to adjust them to a social reality where conventional cate-
gories are increasingly reorganised and splintered. 
11. A large literature discusses Sirk's masterful uses of the domestic melodrama to con-
vey "excessive" social criticism. See for example, Thomas Elsaesser (1992, p. 512-535). 
12. Pierre Bourdieu's notion of the habitus explains how the value judgements of a 
historically-produced social structure become embodied, and naturalised, by social 
actors. The social cognitive notion of the "stereotype threat"—which I will explain 
later in the paper—can be understood as a consequence of people's unconscious, 
habitual knowledge and reproduction of the social structure (and power relations). 
For a detailed description of the habitus see, for example, Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 
p. 78-88). A useful summary of Bourdieu's theory of practice can be found in John B. 
Thompson's introduction to Bourdieu's Language and Symbolic Power (Bourdieu, 
1991, p. 1-31). 
13. Deleuze (1989, p. 103) claims that in That Obscure Object of Desire, Bunuel 
"[...] achieves [...] a direct time image." 
14. The "mother" of feminist linguistics and writing in the 1970s, Robin Lakoff sur-
prisingly reconfirms the stereotypical view of the female "genderlect" advanced by 
sociolinguist Ot to Jespersen in 1922. Following Jespersen, Lakoff characterises 
women's speech as unclear, lacking authority, which she attributes (see "fundamental 
attribution error!) to certain discursive strategies (tag questions, hedges, euphemisms). 
See Robin Tolmach Lakoff (1978). 
Pierre Bourdieu argues that the power of words does not come from the words 
themselves but in the belief of the legitimacy of those who utter them. Bourdieu 
demonstrates how social agents, though their habitus, unwittingly recognise as natural 
(and misrecognise the arbitrariness of) the legitimacy of those speakers who, and 
those words which, represent the dominant paradigm. It is symbolic power that tends 
to posit male discourses as legitimate in contexts that socially and culturally matter. 
Women and their language are viewed negatively because they lack social acceptance. 
Furthermore, because history (i.e., a history of male dominance and of misogyny) is 
made into second natures through the habitus, women are disposed to experience 
their inferiority—and that of their verbal utterances—as a natural condition. See 
Pierre Bourdieu (1991, p. 55, 82 and p. 170). 
15. Emphasis added. 
16. Beside Robin Lakoff, several other feminist critics have commented on the social 
translating skills of women (and, in general, oppressed groups). Audre Lorde, Gloria 
Anzaldua, and Cherrfe Moraga have equally lamented the fact that it has always been 
the task of social outsiders to stretch out and bridge the gap between themselves and 
their masters. Audre Lorde, (1984, p.114); Gloria Anzaldua (1999, p. 107); Cherrfe 
Moraga's "Preface" to Cherrfe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua (1983, p. xv). 
17. See, for example, "Introduction" in Ella Shohat (1998, p. 15 and p. 52). 
18. Due to space constraints, this essay cannot explore Bourdieu's social theory 
(especially his notion of the habitus), which, in my view, could greatly contribute to 
our understanding of the socio-historical construction of women as the "second sex" 
in patriarchy. The habitus, I would argue, can be understood as the sum total of one's 
culturally-shared cognitive schémas: a generative matrix of perceptions, cognitions, 
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and actions. Bourdieu's significant expansion of the schema concept consists in his 
conception of the habitus as social structure embodied, "somatized," so to speak—or 
as history turned second natures. Bourdieu argues that the continued survival of a 
social structure depends on its (mis) recognition by the dominated, who are uncon-
scious of the arbitrary nature of the representations which reinscribe their dominated 
status. This explains, for example, how in patriarchy women unwittingly, so to speak, 
habitually, recognize the norms that constitute them as the "second sex" and even 
contribute to the reproduction of these norms through their, again, habitual actions 
and language. See, for example, Bourdieu (1977 and 1991). 
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